The ayatollahs made out of the Lebanese Shi'ite community’s defense one of their main goals in foreign policy. They were daring when creating Hezbollah, a new political force equipped with both well-armed and well-trained militias. All these actors know of the favorable demographics and that the key is to wait patiently. If Hezbollah is able to block the government, if it is able to convince the rest of Lebanese society that peace depends on that they accept Hezbollah’s leadership and, from that starting point condition, they reach a new political agreement, the victory will be in its hands.

 

Hezbollah’s militia is nowadays Lebanon’s most important army; what makes matters worse is that its members are infiltrated in the National Army and they can destroy it whenever they consider it is the right moment to do so. For that reason, an important part of the Christian-Maronite community has yielded to its blackmail.

 

The murder of top Sunni leader Rafik Hariri led to a surprising agreement between Chirac and Bush to demand responsibilities. After an agreement in the Security Council, Syria gauged its own capabilities and chose to withdraw its troops – too many open fronts for a country weak in economic and military terms, but also isolated and threatened. It seemed that the moment for Lebanon’s democratization had arrived, but democracy is about majorities and, in that respect, Shi'ites have a lot to say.   

 

Since Syria’s withdrawal, two determining facts have taken place. The first one was the war between Israel and Hezbollah, solved with Israel’s non-victory, e.g. equivalent to a political victory for the Islamists. They have demonstrated to the Lebanese society and the Arab world that they can confront Israel and not be defeated – something with which Egyptians, Jordanians, Syrians or Iraqis had not succeeded. Its prestige has grown and, most important, its capability has become evident. Hezbollah underwent great human and material wearout, but thanks to the international forces stationed there, today it has more and better weapons than before the conflict. Under these circumstances, who in Lebanon would dare to confront its forces?

 

The second fact has been the political crisis coming out of the democratization attempt supported by Americans and Europeans. Hezbollah’s ministers withdraw from the Cabinet and blocked the designation of Lebanon’s new president, a position that corresponds to the Christian-Maronite community according to Lebanon’s not-so-democratic distribution of powers. In this situation the Government decided to challenge Hezbollah demanding that it should renounce to its own and exclusive communications system – one more example of a state within a state created by this Iranian branch in the Country of Cedars. The answer was a civil war threat with which Hezbollah demonstrated once more – as if there ever were any doubts – that it has the best military.

The Arab League felt compelled to intervene when faced with the possibility of a crisis that could re-open the civil war with foreseeable negative consequences for the Sunni community – one the League feels it must protect. Its rejection to Hezbollah was evident during the conflict with Israel, when it supported the Jewish State trusting that Israel would do to the Shia the same it did to them in previous occasions.

 

The disappointment was big in the face of how unequally they were treated.  They had the hope to force the “Party of God” to yield positions in the Doha Summit, but what happened was the opposite. Once more, the Arab League demonstrated its weakness. It has merely let the Iranian triumph go on record, recognizing Hezbollah’s right to veto state policy – precisely what the Government of Tehran and its leaders had pursued for years.

 

Westerners and Arabs have ended hand in hand accepting their impotence in the face of Iranian interference in Lebanon. The democratizing process is dead and Lebanon walks towards a regime change that will finally recognize the Shi'ite hegemony under an authoritarian Islamist government.

 

After these concessions, how can we hope that Iran curbs its international interventions or its nuclear program? Why would the winner bow to the will of the vanquished?

 

©2008 Translated by Miryam Lindberg