 Syria-Lebanon
In Libertad Digital nº 1431
The ayatollahs made out of the Lebanese Shi'ite community’s defense one of their main goals in foreign policy. They were daring when creating Hezbollah, a new political force equipped with both well-armed and well-trained militias. All these actors know of the favorable demographics and that the key is to wait patiently. If Hezbollah is able to block the government, if it is able to convince the rest of Lebanese society that peace depends on that they accept Hezbollah’s leadership and, from that starting point condition, they reach a new political agreement, the victory will be in its hands.
by Rafael L. Bardají, May 26, 2008
Commentary nº 974
by Soeren Kern, September 27, 2007
Analysis nº 222
by Rafael L. Bardají, July 12, 2007
Analysis nº 200
by Soeren Kern, November 21, 2006
Briefs nº 36
November 14 marks three months since UN Resolution 1701 brought an end to the 34-day conflict in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah militants. Just before the resolution was adopted last August, a number of European Union countries — including Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden were quick to pledge troops to reinforce the international peace-keeping force known as the UN In-terim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), ostensibly with the aim of transforming the cessation of hostilities into a durable ceasefire.  Download PDF
Collaborations nº 860
by Michael Rubin, March 1, 2006
Collaborations nº 828
On Feb. 22, terrorists bombed the Askariya shrine in Samarra, Iraq. The attack shocked Iraqis and infu-riated Shiites. The Iranian govern-ment sought to direct public anger toward Washington. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei blamed \"intel-ligence agencies of the occupiers of Iraq and the Zionists.\" Iran\'s Arabic-language al-Alam television re-peated the accusations on Feb. 23. Because al-Alam is broadcast terres-trially, it is particularly influential among poor Iraqis who cannot af-ford a satellite dish.  Download PDF
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